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Two Tales of Epistemic Models
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This short paper has two parts. First, we prove a generalisation of Aumann’s surprising
impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. We then move, in the second
part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemicmodels, and
we do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to high-
light certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person
asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, we argue, reveals cer-
tain limits of what epistemic models can be.
1. Introduction
In a well-known article titled “Agreeing to Disagree,” Aumann (1976) proved a sur-
prising impossibility result. The result was given in a Bayesian setting and was accom-
panied by an extraordinary cover story: If a group of people have common priors, and
their posteriors of a given event are also common knowledge, then no matter what re-
spective evidence they each obtains in updating their probabilities on the event it must
be that their posteriors are identical. In other words, it is impossible for these agents to
form different (probabilistic) opinions about any given event.
Aumann’s result prompted a long and fruitful series of studies on the epistemic
foundations of game theory in the economic literature. To uncover the basic logic
behind the so-called agreeing-to-disagree type argument, in Section 2, we provide a
generalisation of this impossibility result in the context of rational decision making.
Our generalisation carries a similar element of surprise: If a group of (human or ma-
chine) decision makers have similar backgrounds, follow the same decision procedure
in decision situations, and that, in making any particular decision, their decisions are
commonly shared; then, no matter what respective private information they each pos-
sesses in making their final decisions, it is impossible that these decisions differ.
Dramatic as it may sound, this generalisation, like many agreeing-to-disagree type
arguments, relies on the interpretation of the formalism involved. The latter, however,
often contains various highly idealised and, in some cases, notoriously ambiguous
assumptions. These idealisations in turn may give rise to various mysteries or even
inconsolable disputes among experts.
Indeed, along with rapid developments of game theory in the past four decades
or so we have seen increasing and persistent disagreements among philosophers and
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game theorists on foundational issues concerning the interpretational meaning of var-
ious basic concepts in game theory. The heated exchange between Kadane and Larkey
(1982a,b) and Harsanyi (1982a,b) is one such example of clash of opinions among ex-
perts, where both sides provide strong yet opposing views on how basic notions such
as Nash equilibrium and common priors should be understood.1 The broader philo-
sophical aim of this paper is to continue these conversations on foundational issues,
and to provide an analysis of the interpretational value of some specific aspects of
epistemic models.
To broaden and to put our discussion on a more concrete footing, in Section 3 we
highlight an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The latter is an area of research in
philosophy closely related to epistemic game theory in economics. The puzzle can be
dubbed along the following lines: Unless an agent is epistemically ideal (to be made
precise below) it is impossible for them to know their own epistemic limitations. We
argue that this simple puzzle reveals a certain shortcoming of epistemic modelling,
that is, within the confines of how notions like knowledge, beliefs, and information
are represented in epistemic models, many suboptimal epistemic properties do not
seem to be characterisable in these models.
As we will see, there is a common theme that runs through both stories presented
here, and it concerns the first/third-person asymmetry commonly seen in epistemic mod-
els, i.e., the contrast between the perspective of the agents being modelled and that of
the theorists who carry out the modelling. This observation is not new, but it is not
widely appreciated as it should be. We shall demonstrate this asymmetry in a simple
and streamlined manner. Our aim is to stress the significance, as well as the implica-
tions, of this asymmetry in a broader context of epistemic and decision/game-theoretic
modelings in general, and to highlight a certain limit of what epistemic models can be.
In what follows, we presuppose some knowledge in epistemic logic. But to make
the paper more or less self-contained, we will introduce various basic concepts and
formal definitions. All trivial proofs are omitted. Readers who are not interested in
the formalism presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 may skip directly to the ‘story time’ in
Section 2.3 without missing much of the philosophical content of the paper.
2. Impossible to Disagree
2.1. Preliminaries
Let W be a (finite) set, referred to as the state space. A Kripke model (of knowledge or
beliefs) overW is a relational structure distinguished by a binary relation;  WW,
where; is often referred to as an accessibility relation among possible states. Intuitively,
w;i w0 says that, from the perspective of player i, w0 is considered doxastically possi-
ble in state w. We also say that state w0 is;i-accessible from w. The following is a list of
properties of; that are commonly adopted in a Kripke frame: for any w,w0,w00 2 W,
1. Another notable example can be seen in a standard graduate textbook in game theory by
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), where, from time to time, the authors disagree with one another on
various foundational issues and record their respective views in parallel.
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Seriality for each w there exists an w0 such that w; w0.
Reflexivity w; w.
Transitivity if w; w0and w0 ; w00 then w; w00.
Euclid if w; w0 and w; w00 then w0 ; w00.
As standard definitions in epistemic logic, i is said to be a S4 agent if;i is reflexive
and transitive, a S5 agent if it is also Euclidean. The latter is taken to be epistemically
ideal as they satisfies both the positive and the negative introspection conditions.
Information structure. Given;i above, define function I i : W! 2W as
I i(w) :=
n
w0 2 W j w;i w0
o
. (2.1)
Then I i(w) is the set of states that are;i-accessible from w, call I i(w) the information
set of i in state w. The interpretation is that I i(w) contains all the relevant information
that is accessible by i at w. For any event E (a set of states), denote by I i(E) the set
of all states that are;i-accessible from all states in E, i.e., I i(E) = Sw2E I i(w). Next,
define I i = fI i(w) j w 2 Wg to be the information structure of player i: I i provides a
complete description of information accessible by i in each state.2
Player i is said to be informed of (the occurrence of) a certain event E in state w
just in case I i(w)  E, i.e., if the information i possesses at w is contained in E. If
the underlying model is intended to be a representation of agents’ knowledge (beliefs)
then I i(w)  E is interpreted as saying that i knows (believes in) E in w.
Alternatively, one can take the information function I i : W ! 2W of player i as
primitive and define i’s accessibility relation;i over W by
;i:=
n
(w,w0) 2 WW  w0 2 I i(w)o. (2.2)
Consider the following properties of an information structure I : for any w 2 W,
Viability I(w) 6= Æ.
Factivity w 2 I(w).
Inclusion if w0 2 I(w) then I(w0)  I(w).
Mutuality if w0,w00 2 I(w) then w00 2 I(w0) and w0 2 I(w00).
Proposition 2.1. Let I be an information structure and; be the corresponding acces-
sibility relation for which (2.1) and (2.2) are satisfied, then
2. In order not to overburden the symbolism in use, here we adopt a systematic ambiguity of
using I i to denote the information structure of player i, I i(w) to denote the information i possesses
at w, and I(E) to denote the collective information i possesses at all states in E.
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w1 // w2

Figure 2.1: Player i’s information structure with one blindspot.
(1) ; is serial if and only if I is viable,
(2) ; is reflexive if and only if I is factive,
(3) ; is transitive if and only if I is inclusive,
(4) ; is Euclidean if and only if I is mutual.
Definition 2.2. An information structure I is said to be divisible if it is (a) viable, (b)
inclusive, and (c) mutual; I is partitional if it is divisible and I(W) = W.
It is easy to see that if I is divisible then, for any w,w0 2 W, either I(w)\ I(w0) =
Æ or I(w) = I(w0). Further, if I is divisible then, by Proposition 2.1, the correspond-
ing accessibility relation ; forms an equivalence relation over W, in which case we
have that I(w) = [w]; for all w 2 W.
Doxastic blindspot. The above construction enables a formal classification of states
in W. Note that if I(W) is a proper subset of W, i.e., if W  I(W) 6= Æ, then it follows
that there are states that do not belong to any information set. In other words, given
definitions in (2.1) and (2.2), members ofW I(W) are states that are not;i-accessible
for i from any state in W. We refer to such states as player i’s doxastic blindspots.
Formally, for any w 2 W, w is said to be a doxastic blindspot (or blindspot for short) of
player i if there does not exist any n 2 W such that w 2 I i(n). Denote the set of all
blindspots of i by Bi(W).
Example 2.3. Let W = fw1,w2g and I i(w1) = I i(w2) = fw2g. Then w1 is a doxastic
blindspot for i (see Figure 2.1).
A doxastic blindspot w can also be interpreted as saying that the agent may falsely
believe I i(w) as they do not consider w as an epistemic possibility. Then, from the def-
inition, it is clear that the concept of blindspots is only intelligible when it is modelled
from the third person point of view – a lesson we learn from G. E. Moore. We shall
return to this point on first/third person asymmetry in the next section. The following are
some simple properties of doxastic blindspots.
Proposition 2.4. I i(W) \ Bi(W) = Æ and I i(W) [ Bi(W) = W.
Note that the existence of blindspots differentiates a doxastic information model
from an epistemic one. The latter is widely employed in representing knowledge
where it is assumed that w 2 I i(w) for all w 2 W, that is, it is assumed that it is
impossible that the players’ information sets exclude “the true state of the world” (and
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hence there is no blindspot). The assumption is often referred to as the “truth con-
dition” of information sets which is connected to the assumption that knowledge is
infallible.
This assumption is by no means uncontroversial, especially when viewed from
the agent’s first person perspective – it is unclear how blindspots can be eliminated
by stipulating that players’ information be always truthful. As we shall see, contrary
to what many had thought, this infallibility condition is in fact not essential to the
agreeing-to-disagree type arguments, to which we now turn.
A generalised sure-thing principle. To arrive at a generalisation of Aumann’s im-
possibility result for rational decision making, we invoke a general decision rule. Here
we are guided by the “sure-thing principle” of Savage (1972).
Recall that Savage’s sure-thing principle – formulated as the second postulate (P2)
in his axiomatic system – is derived from, what he calls, a “loose” version of the sure-
thing principle (STP) which says that if a decision maker prefers one act over another
assuming either that a certain event obtains or that it does not obtain, then their pref-
erence ranking over the two acts should remain unchanged regardless how this given
event transpires.3
This “loose” version of STP is sometimes referred to as the dominance principle. The
latter captures an intuitive idea of reasoning by cases: if one option is weakly pre-
ferred to others in all situation under which these options are compared then it should
be weakly preferred simpliciter. This consideration then gives rise to the following
decision rule which generalises the sure-thing principle.
General Sure-Thing Principle (GSTP): If a decision maker makes the same decision
conditioning on the information they possesses in all possible decision situa-
tions, then they should make the same decision unconditionally.
Formally, let D be a nonempty set with an unspecified domain. We take that an
agent’s decision algorithm – i.e., the manner with which the agent makes decision – is
determined by a function f mapping from 2W to D.
Definition 2.5. A decision algorithm f : 2W ! D is said to be an informational decision
function for player i if, for any S  W, the following condition holds:
f
 I i(n) = d for all n 2 S =) f [
n2S
I i(n)

= d. (GSTP)
Intuitively, f
 I i(n) = d is a decision made by player i according to the decision
algorithm f based on their information in state n (i.e., I i(n)), and S is a set of possible
decision situations. Then (GSTP) says that if player i makes the same decision d in all
possible situations in S (i.e., i makes the same decision d based on information I i(n)
for all n 2 S), then they decide on d simpliciter.4
3. For an analysis of the subtle difference between the sure-thing principle in its original form
and its formulation as P2 in Savage’s axiomatic system see Liu (2017).
4. See Lederman (2013, section 8.2) for a discussion on a similar principle. I thank Harvey Leder-
man for pointing this out to me after he read an earlier version of this paper.
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Group information. In the interactive situation, let ;N be the smallest transitive
relation that contains all the;i relations, that is,
;N := TC
 [
i2N
;i

, (2.3)
where ‘TC’ stands for the transitive closure operator. Then, relation ;N represents
the maximum reachability relation of all;i’s (cf. Proposition 2.6(1) below). Call;N
the group accessibility relation of N. For any (w,w0) 2;N , we also say that w0 is;N-
accessible from w. From the group accessibility relation;N a corresponding notion of
group information function IN : W! 2W can be defined by
IN(w) =
n
w0 2 W  w;N w0o. (2.4)
And let IN be the group information structure such that IN = fIN(w) j w 2 Wg.
Alternatively, one can take players’ information structures I1, . . . , In as primitive
and define group information structure IN as themeet of the I is, i.e., as it is standardly
defined in Boolean algebra,
IN = ^
i2N
I i. (2.5)
Then define group accessibility relation;N by
;N :=
n
(w,w0) 2 WW  w0 2 IN(w)o. (2.3’)
Let E be any event, say that E is common information among members of group N
at w, if IN(w)  E. The following is a list of basic properties of the group accessibility
relation;N and the group information structure IN .
Proposition 2.6. Let I i,;N , and IN be defined as above, then we have
(1) For any (w,w0) 2;N , there corresponds a sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik 2 N and a
sequence of states w0,w1, . . . ,wk 2 fn j w ;N ng with w0 = w and wk = w0
such that w0 ;i1 w1 ;i2   ;ik wk, where 0  k < ¥.
(2) For any w 2 W we have I i(w)  IN(w).
(3) For any w 2 W and for any i 2 N, we have I i IN(w)  IN(w).
(4) Given any w 2 W, if, for any i, j 2 N, I i and I j are divisible and I i(W) = I j(W),
then IN(w) = I i IN(w).
2.2. Agreeing-to-disagree generalised
With all the preparations given above, we are now in the position to prove the follow-
ing result, which is a generalisation of Aumann’s impossibility result in the context of
decision making guided by a generalised sure-thing principle (GSTP).
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Theorem 2.7. Let W,N, I i be defined as above and w be the actual state of the world.
Suppose that, for any i, j 2 N,
1. I i, I j are divisible;
2. Bi(W) = B j(W);
3. f is an informational decision function for all players in N; and
4. i’s decision di is common information shared among members of N at w.
Then, di = dj for all i, j 2 N.
Proof. For any i 2 N, consider the event
Ei =
n
n 2 W  f  I i(n) = dio, di 2 D (2.6)
where Ei is the set of possible states in which f yield di given player i’s information
I i(n) at n. It is plain that w 2 Ei for all i 2 N. By definition, the assumption that di’s
are common information at w amounts to
IN(w)  \
i2N
Ei. (2.7)
Then, n 2 IN(w) implies n 2 Ei via (2.7), and hence, by (2.6),
f
 I i(n) = di. (2.8)
Note that each I i is assumed to be divisible, this implies, by Proposition 2.6(4), that,
for each i 2 N,
IN(w) = [
n2IN(w)
I i(n). (2.9)
Finally, since f is an informational decision function for each i, apply (GSTP) to (2.8)
and (2.9), we get
f
 IN(w) = di.
Therefore, di = dj for all i, j 2 N.
Remark 2.8. If f is a conditional probability of a given event A (i.e., if f () = Pr(A j ))
and I i(W) = W (and hence Bi(W) = Æ by Proposition 2.4), then the impossibility
result of Aumann (1976) becomes a special case of this theorem.
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2.3. Story time
Now let us turn the premises and the conclusion of Theorem 2.7 into a cover story: For
any group of decision makers, if
1. the organisation of their information are well structured (i.e., satisfying the di-
visibility requirement, that is, for any player and any states w, n, the respective
information I(w) and I(n) on which their decisions are based in these states are
either identical or completely disjoint);
2. they have similar biases (i.e., sharing the same blindspots);
3. they follow the same decision procedures in decisions situations (i.e. using the
same decision algorithm/function that respects GSTP); and
4. for any given pending decision, if the decisions each member independently
made are shared as common information among the entire group.
Then, regardless what individual information they each possessed in making their re-
spective decision, it is impossible that they make different decisions in the end!
Presumably, with a touch of imagination, our cover story can be transformed into
a telling tale. Take, for instance, the currently popular subject on the long-term impacts
of AI technologies. A stirring story can be told about a group of powerful AIs. Imagine
that each of these AIs was created by means of certain “copy-and-paste” procedure
(conditions 1-3), and they are highly coordinated and constantly communicate with
one another about their life choices (condition 4); but quite unexpectedly, so the story
goes, these AIs start consistently making the same bad decisions against the humans (a
dramatic yet conceivable possibility that is consistent with the theorem proved above),
and eventually drive humanity to the edge of extinction!
3.What Epistemic Models Cannot Be
Fictional stories aside, what interests us besides the theorem proved above is how and
from what standpoint should this type of results be interpreted. Note that, in the
case of our result, we were helpfully aided by the concept of doxastic blindspots (in
conditions 2) which, by its very nature, is not something that is accessible by players
themselves. This indicates that our result can only bemade intelligible from an entirely
detached point of view. In fact, all of conditions 1-4 can been seen as meta-theoretic infor-
mation gathered and formulated by a theorist, and Theorem 2.7 is entirely proved and
interpreted from this theorist’s external point of view – indeed, that is precisely what
we, qua theorists, just did throughout Section 2.
A natural question, however, can be raised here: If we, as external theorists, can
theorise and model the situation, why cannot the players themselves do the same mod-
elling? Of course, given the particular theorem proved above, it makes no sense for
players to observe and model their own blindspots. But supposedly there are situa-
tions where these agents are more epistemically capable, so to speak, and be able to
8
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w1

// w2

Figure 3.1: A model of S4
model the game-theoretic situation from their own first-person perspectives, in which
case the theorist and the agent have an integrated single standpoint.
After all, let’s face it, if game theory is to be ‘useful’ at all, it must be that the players
themselves can somehow use the theory to guide their actions in game situations – it
would otherwise be disappointing if all the comings and goings of a game go to the
onlookers while the players themselves are left clueless about what is going on with
the game.
3.1. A puzzle
Given this challenge from our critic, let us move to empower our agents with more
epistemic capabilities: Let us assume that our agents are as epistemically capable as a
S4 agent. The latter was in fact studied by Hintikka in his original work on epistemic
logic (Hintikka, 1962), where the agents – being S4 – are not assumed to have any
blindspots. In addition, to match the capacity of external theorists, let us assume that
the agents also have access to the meta-theoretical information about how their own
epistemic structures are organised!
Ambitious and capable as our agent now is, we however would like to point out
a puzzling phenomenon for this way of modelling agents’ epistemic corpus. More
precisely, we show that within the standard possible world semantics the following
cannot hold simultaneously:
i. The agent is aware of their current epistemic situation.
ii. The agent has access to their own epistemic structure.
iii. The agent is an S4 agent.
To illustrate, let us continue to use I() and I to denote the information function and
information structure defined in Section 2.1. Then, condition (i) means that, for any
given state w, the agent is aware of all the alternative states that are accessible from w,
i.e., I(w) – or, to use our terminology, the agent is informed of I(w) because, trivially,
I(w)  I(w). Conditions (ii) and (iii) are our assumptions.
Now, by truth definition in a Kripke frame, a proposition p is said to be known
by the agent at w, denoted by w  Kp, if p is true in all the worlds in I(w). Further,
as what is characteristic of an S4 agent, I is assumed to be viable and inclusive (or
equivalently, the underlying accessibility relation ; is assumed to be reflexive and
transitive). In a model of knowledge, this translates into the assumption of the truth
axiom (Kp ! p) and that of the positive introspection axiom (Kp ! KKp).
Consider the simple example illustrated in Figure 3.1, whereW contains two possi-
ble worlds and the agent’s alternativeness relation is represented by the directed graph
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with I(w1) = fw1,w2g and I(w2) = fw2g. Trivially, this is a model of S4. Suppose
that w1 is the real world and that p is true in w1 but false in w2. Then, by truth defini-
tion, p is not known by the agent at w1.
So far, nothing in what we have described is out of ordinary. However, observe
that, at w1, the agent may as well have the following (meta)-reasoning:
“My epistemic structure is I = I(w1), I(w2)	, where I(w1) and I(w2)
are distinctive with I(w1) = fw1,w2g and I(w2) = fw2g. Now given
that I currently consider both w1 and w2 as epistemically possible, then
the only possible world in which I could be in such a state is world w1,
therefore w1 must be the real world!”
This consideration then leads the agent to exclude w2 as an alternative. As a conse-
quence of this realisation, p becomes known by the agent at w1 given the truth defini-
tion. But this is very puzzling because the change of the agent’s knowledge of p from unknown
to known rests on no further evidence but mere reflection on their own epistemic structure!
The puzzle can also be stated in the following form. Let Ann be an S4 but not
S5 agent and let p be any proposition, which Ann does not know, but also does not
know that she does not know (i.e., :Ka:Kap). For example, let p be expressed by
the sentence, say, “Michael Atiyah claimed to have proved the Riemann conjecture.”
Suppose that Bill, who knows that Ann is an S4 agent, asks Ann whether she knows
that p. Assume, moreover, that the exchange is subject to the rule that the speaker
will not assert any proposition that she does not know to be true. Furthermore, the
agents are fully cooperative and will provide the fullest information they have that is
relevant to the question. In that case, Ann cannot give any honest yes/no answer to
Bill’s question. Bill can then deduce from the fact that Ann could not answer ‘No’ that
Ann does not know that p. But if Bill can deduce it, why cannot Ann herself deduce
it? In fact, why can’t Ann ask this question herself, “Do I know that p?” and then, if
she knows that she is an S4 agent, she can derive, from her inability to answer ‘No,’
the fact that she does not know. Thus she becomes an S5 agent. If she knows that she
is an S4 agent, this deduction requires only a minimal meta-reflection on herself. The
conclusion seems to be that an S4, but not S5 agent, cannot know that she is an S4
agent.5
To be sure, the crux of the puzzlement lies in assumption (ii), where we made an
attempt to empower our agent with the ability of accessing the meta-theoretic infor-
mation of their own epistemic type – the kind of information that an external theorist
normally possesses. However our puzzle suggests that our S4 agent simply cannot
consume such information on pain of incoherence.
The lesson we learn from this puzzle seems to be that there is something dis-
tinctive about the perspective of first-person agents and that of a third-person theo-
rist/onlooker in epistemic models – such first/third-person asymmetry may create a
divide that is unbridgeable even for someone as capable as a S4 agent, let alone for
those who are less capable than S4, epistemically speaking.
5. Thanks are due to Haim Gaifman for suggesting to me this way of formulating the puzzle.
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Now, to return to our critic’s question as to why the players themselves cannot
be the theorist who comes to theorise the game situation at hand with a detailed mod-
elling of their own epistemic scope, we would like to follow upwith a further question:
What does it even mean for an agent to acquire this type of meta-theoretic information
about their own epistemic structure at all, and, more importantly, how?
3.2. All-inclusive states
Luckily, the players modelled in Aumann’s original agreeing-to-disagree argument are
all S5 agents, so his system is – at least on the face of it – not plagued by the puzzle we
just described where the protagonist is a S4 agent. However, this does not mean that
the question raised above about the contrast between the perspective of the players
and that of a theorist can be automatically dispensed with in such models. Besides,
what is so special about S5 agents after all? What enables them to lift themselves to
the level of an external theorist?
In a later work, Aumann (1987) described the asymmetry of different epistemic
viewpoints in terms of the tension between the “Bayesian” (first-person) and the “game-
theoretic” (third-person) views of the world. He maintains that these two perspectives
can be coherently integrated in an analytic model. At the core of Aumann’s proposal
lies the assumption of so-called “all-inclusive” states of the world. This concept has
since then been widely adopted in game-theoretic analyses.6 Here is an explicit char-
acterisation of the nature of an all-inclusive state given by Geanakoplos (1992):
A “state of the world" is very detailed. It specifies the physical universe,
past, present, and future; it describes what every agent knows, and what
every agent knows about what every agent knows, and so on; it specifies
what every agent does, and what every agent thinks about what every
agent does, and what every agent thinks about what every agent thinks
about what every agent does, and so on; it specifies the utility to every
agent of every action, not only of those that are taken in that state of na-
ture, but also those that hypothetically might have been taken, and it spec-
ifies what everybody thinks about the utility to everybody else of every
possible action, and so on; it specifies not only what agents know, but
what probability they assign to every event, and what probability they as-
sign to every other agent assigning some probability to each event, and so
on. (p. 57, emphasis added)
6. Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) adopted a more refined approach to the problem where
each player’s belief about other players’ actions and beliefs are explicitly represented by the notions
of conjectures and theories respectively. Both concepts are constituent components of the player’s
types, an idea originated by Harsanyi (1968), which essentially plays the same role as all-inclusive
states with perhaps less informative contents about the physical world. But, at any rate, each type
profile (a state) includes a description of actions of all players and it is further assumed that there is a
common prior defined over all states. This implies that the players have prior probabilistic judgments
over their own actions. This, however, is the recipe for another heated debate in the foundations of
Bayesian probability/decision theory on action credences. For a discussion see Liu and Price (2019).
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In other words, a state is taken to be a complete description of the world, which in-
cludes not only the information about the actions each player carries out and their
mutual beliefs about what the others believe and are likely to do, which are usually
direct targets of game-theoretic modelling; it contains also meta-theoretic information
such as players’ probabilities judgements over all the states, their criteria for decision
making (including to what extend the other players are being rational), as well as their
information structures over the states. The slogan is ‘conditioning on one particular
state, everybody knows everything!’
Alas, dear readers, it seems that we have now reached an impasse of having to
untangle yet another creature of so-called ‘all-inclusive states,’ which, by definition, is
all-knowing, all-wise, and all-powerful. What can we say about that?
3.3. Shadows remain
In this essay we told two tales about epistemic models with the goal of gaining in-
sight of how certain ways of modelling knowledge/beliefs are possible, if at all. Both
stories uncovered an important feature of first/third-person asymmetry in epistemic
modelling. The lesson we learned seems to be that, unless we take a leap of faith in
believing that for finite beings like us who stand the chance of accessing and com-
prehending ‘all-inclusive states,’ then, from agents’ first-person perspectives there is
always something that remains as mystery to themselves. It is reminiscent that un-
der the sun everything leaves a shadow one way or another, except, of course, for the
almighty sun itself.
Acknowledgement
I am grateful to Jessica Collins and Haim Gaifman for helpful feedback on early ver-
sions of this paper, and to three anonymous referees for many astute comments. This
publication was made possible through the support of the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-
2018-305) and the Isaac Newton Trust (18.08(o)).
References
Aumann, R. J. (1976). Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics, 4(6):1236–1239.
Aumann, R. J. (1987). Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality.
Econometrica, 55(1):1–18.
Aumann, R. J. and Brandenburger, A. (1995). Epistemic conditions for Nash equilib-
rium. Econometrica, 63(5):1161–1180.
Geanakoplos, J. (1992). Common knowledge. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
6(4):53–82.
Harsanyi, J. (1967-1968). Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian"
players, I-III. Management science, 14(3):159–182, 320–334, 486–502.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1982a). Rejoinder to professors Kadane and Larkey. Management Sci-
ence, 28(2):124–125.
12
Two Tales of Epistemic Models
Harsanyi, J. C. (1982b). Subjective probability and the theory of games: Comments on
Kadane and Larkey’s paper. Management Science, 28(2):120–124.
Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief: an introduction to the logic of the two notions.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Kadane, J. and Larkey, P. (1982a). Subjective probability and the theory of games. Man-
agement Science, 28(2):113–120.
Kadane, J. B. and Larkey, P. D. (1982b). Reply to professor Harsanyi. Management
Science, 28(2):124.
Lederman, H. (2013). People with common priors can agree to disagree. The Review of
Symbolic Logic, 8(1):11–45.
Liu, Y. (2017). The sure-thing principle and P2. Economics Letters, 159:221–223.
Liu, Y. and Price, H. (2019). Heart of DARCness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
97(1):136–150.
Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A. (1994). A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
Savage, L. J. (1972). The Foundations of Statistics. Dover Publications, Inc., New York,
second revised edition.
13
